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Introduction 
This working paper comes out of a seminar held at Middlesex University Business School in 
January 2010, part of an ESRC funded series looking at the future of regulation of the 
employment relationship. The seminar focussed on the issue of precarious work and current 
European and international regulatory approaches. The seminar looked in some detail at the 
work of national and global trade unions in their attempts to improve working conditions for 
precarious workers.  
 
Speakers were Aranya Pakaphat (ICEM), Kirill Buketov (IUF), Jenny Holdcroft (IMF), Keith 
Ewing (Kings College London), Richard Hyman, Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick (Birkbeck) and 
Richard Croucher and Elizabeth Cotton, both from Middlesex University Business School.  
 
One of the key challenges for tackling the issue of precarious work relates to the research 
deficit that currently exists. The overall purpose of this seminar, and the series in general is to 
promote research, particularly collaborative work between different organisations and 
universities. The current recession underlines the importance of this work, with precarious 
workers particularly vulnerable to job loss and general lack of regulatory protections.  
 
The difficulty of articulation 
How to talk about this diverse and complex phenomenon is the first problem we face. There is 
no accepted terminology and there are thousands of forms of working arrangements that fall 
under the general term of ‘precarious work‘. This is not simply a problem for researchers and 
academics, but a problem for policy makers, regulators and trade unions. If we cannot 
conceptualise the changes that are taking place in the organisation of work, then we will 
struggle to formulate responses, strategies and regulatory mechanisms.  This problem of 
articulation has been a long standing one at international level with the ILO’s own attempts to 
define ‘contract work’ failing after several decades of discussion.  
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Externalisation is a broad term that is useful in encapsulating the change that is taking place, 
signifying the distance that is placed between employer and the employee in the shift towards 
indirect employment. Externalisation here means the trend of obtaining labour from outside of a 
corporation’s boundaries, linked to the strategy of outsourcing non-core functions. A second 
term used is triangulation, meaning third party involvement in the supply and management of 
labour. Both of these definitions are helpful in describing the general movement that is taking 
place and also in framing the problem of regulating work where it is not obvious how to 
distribute employer responsibilities. 
 
Precarious work is a term that is widely used to incorporate a wide range of work forms, such 
as temporary agency work to homeworking. Although not a precise definition it is generally 
understood to incorporate internationally recognisable work arrangements such as on call/daily 
hire, homeworking, self-employment, temporary agency work,  probationary periods, student 
traineeships and fixed term temporary contracts. 
 
A term which reflects the strategic direction of many multinational corporations comes from the 
UNILEVER case study presented at the workshop, ‘Hindustanisation’, referring to the trend 
towards use of contract and agency labour replacing permanent jobs, in this case in 
UNILEVER’s operations in India.  
 
This difficultly in naming what is happening exists at national and international levels. At 
national level the example was given of unions in Colombia, where when initial research was 
initiated there were no existing terms for precarious work. Unions and researchers initially used 
the term ‘contratistas’, using the same word for the contractors and the contract workers. 
Because of the confusion this caused alternative words were tried, with agreement reached on 
‘trabajadores tercerizados’ and ‘tercerizacion”, or ‘third party contracting’ simply defined as 
when an activity is transferred to another company and ceases to be carried out by direct 
company employees. This definition, although probably too simple for current purposes at the 
time was adequate because it allowed researchers and unions to explore the various types of 
contract and employment relations that exist in Colombia. 
 
At international level the problems are multiplied with little consensus about working 
arrangements between countries and sectors. Global unions have had to compromise in terms 
of precision in order to find terms that can be recognized and used at regional and international 
levels. The International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), for example, uses the term ‘precarious 
work’ because it is translatable and unites a broad range of pheonomena. This process of 
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identifying employment trends and carrying out initial research by the global union federations 
(GUFs) has taken a period of seven to eight years. Prior to this it was common for unions to 
assume that the arrangement did not exist in their sectors, because of the low visibility of the 
problem, or that it was unique to their sectors or employers. In some cases unions even 
believed that it was illegal to organise contract and agency workers. 
 
Another assumption that has been made is that this precariousness is restricted to developing 
countries. Research, including the work of Richard Hyman and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick 
presented at the workshop, indicates that it is widespread across Western Northern Europe, 
what they refer to as the ‘thirdworldisation” of work in Europe. Examples given during the 
seminar included BMW’s Leipzig plant, where 30% of production workers are employed by 
agencies and not, therefore, covered by the same collective bargaining agreement, they cannot 
carry out industrial action against BMW, nor do they have representation on the supervisory 
board. This was described as having a corrosive undermining of standards, through 
establishing competition between workers for permanent or direct contracts of employment.  
 
In many cases there is pay discrimination between permanent and precarious workers although 
it is important not to over generalise as many high skilled contractors are paid higher amounts. 
More importantly for employers than the rate of pay is the low level of legal protection that 
these workers receive, particularly in relation to flexibility. Flexibility is, of course, the most 
significant incentive for employers to use precarious work forms, because people can be 
effectively hired and fired at will.  
 
Length of service varies enormously for precarious workers. In the Thai Industrial Gases (TIG) 
case presented at the seminar, contract workers had been working in the same plant for over 
ten years, whereas for agency workers in the UK, according to government statistics, 37% of 
assignments were for less than six weeks, 55% less than three months, 45% are for three 
months or more. 
 
Richard and Rebecca‘s research shows, unsurprisingly, that precarious work is linked to a 
lower unionisation rate. In the UK, 28% of permanent workers are unionised, but only 17% of 
temporary workers. In the ten European countries they are researching unionisation is low, in 
part explained by the pressure on precarious workers not to identify themselves as problematic 
but also in some countries due to the prevalence of women, ethnic minorities and migrant 
workers, and young people in precarious work, groups which represent a long standing 
organising challenge to unions.  Precarious work arrangements naturally lead to a great deal of 
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insecurity, many changing their jobs regularly. This lack of workplace stability and also the lack 
of worker commitment to their job or sector impacts union capacity to use workplace organizing 
models, not least because of the financial impact that organising atypical workers has. 
 
The costs however are not limited to trade unions. There are evidently costs to national 
governments, through the transfer of risk from employers to employees and then on to 
governments and welfare systems. The costs, for example, to governments in relation to loss of 
pension contributions and decline in workplace skills development should, and often is, 
quantified to identify the broader national and social costs of precarious work.  
 
Although in many cases not financial, there are also costs to the companies that use precarious 
work arrangements. Probably the most researched area relates to health and safety, with 
demonstrable risks and costs to companies operating in dangerous sectors such as chemicals 
and mining. It is also increasingly an important part of raising leverage in negotiations with 
employers to argue the impact on the company in relation to productivity, quality and standards, 
retention of skilled workers and commitment of the workforce. Although not always quantifiable 
there are links between the use of precarious work forms and competitiveness of company 
operations.  
 
 
Data and Research 
As a result of these difficulties in articulating what changes are taking place in work 
arrangements, there is a significant lack of research and comparative data. The ETUC 
estimates there are six million agency workers in the EU, 1.3 million alone estimated to be 
working in the UK. We know that internationally the use of contract and agency labour exists in 
every sector, from the electronics sector where between 80-90% of workers are defined as in 
precarious employment, to even the education sector (IMF 2008).  Partly because of the 
diversity in categories/definitions but also because of the only recent creation of the 
phenomenon in some countries, there currently is no comprehensive or comparative data. If we 
look at the data below, collected as part of the process of developing the EU directive on 
Temporary Agency Work, we can see that even for this fairly clearly defined category in a 
region where labour statistics are not generally problematic, there are real data collection 
problems. Part of this is related to the newly legalised work arrangements in many European 
countries. In the recent 2009 Eurofound report on temporary agency work and collective 
bargaining, no country is wholly satisfied with their statistical accuracy or capacity to collect 
data.  
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Temporary Agency Work 2007 
Country Number of 
TAWs 2007 
Sector 
Revenue Euro 
Millions 2007 
Perception of Data 
UK 1,196,000 35,700 Inconsistent – the relevant ministry (BERR) thus commissioned a 
quantitative study of the sector in 2008. 
Netherlands 233,000 11,300 Variable quality 
Italy 594,744 6,290 Good: reliable data is provided by the Study Centre Observatory of 
Temporary Work (Osservatorio Centro Studi per il Lavoro Temporaneo), 
created by FORMATEMP and EBITEMPhat TAW operations have been 
permissible for only three years. 
Denmark 20,600 1,038 Limited: reflects recent origin of TAW arrangement and growth through 
migrant labour. 
Spain 160,000 3,733 Quite reliable, given formalities required for TAW contracting 
Czech 
Republic 
35000 153 Agencies are obliged to report data annually to the Ministry, or attract a 
fine of CZK 500,000; however, but only a third of all agencies complies. 
The requirement is not enforced partly because the Ministry cannot cope 
with current levels of data given the large number of agencies now 
operating. 
Latvia 
  
Not available; TAW is at a very early stage and official surveys do not 
differentiate it. 
Bulgaria 
  
None available as TAW is without statutory basis. 
 
 
 
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Temporary agency work and collective 
bargaining in the EU, 2008 
 
 
 
It is, however, both useful and necessary to attempt to put forward some quantitative 
measures. Initial findings of Richard and Rebecca’s current research project offers us some 
broad quantification of precarious work.  
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Indicators of ‘atypical’ and ‘precarious’ work: 10 countries 
Co
unt
ry 
P-T 
a 
Temp 
a 
TAW 
b 
S-E c EPL d 
1        
2        
3 
  
SE 25.
1 
17.5 1.0 6.4 2.9 4.5 1.6 
DK 24.
1 
8.7 1.2 4.5 1.5 3.9 1.4 
DE 26.
0 
14.6 1.6 6.1 2.7 3.8 1.8 
AT 22.
6 
8.9 1.4 6.8 2.4 3.3 1.5 
NL 46.
8 
18.1 2.5 8.7 3.1 3.0 1.2 
FR 17.
2 
14.4 2.1 5.8 2.5 2.1 3.6 
IT 13.
6 
13.2 0.6 17.3 1.8 4.9 2.1 
BE 22.
1 
8.6 2.3 9.0 1.7 4.1 2.6 
UK 25.
5 
5.8 5.0 10.2 1.1 2.9 0.4 
IE 16.
8 
7.3 1.3 10.7 1.6 2.4 0.6 
 
 
 
 
a) European Commission, Employment in Europe 2008. Data for 2007. P-T: based on national definitions. Temp = fixed-
term contracts 
b) Vanselow, A. And Weinkopf, C. (2009) Zeitarbeit in europäischen Ländern: Lehren für Deutschland? Estimates for 
2006.  
c) European Foundation, Industrial Relations Developments in Europe 2008. Self-employed persons not employing any 
employees, 2007. 
d) OECD, Employment Outlook 2004. Restrictiveness (index 0-6) of legislation regulating 1] individual dismissals, 2] 
collective redundancies, 3] fixed-term contracts. 
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Using this table, we can see that there are large variations in types of work arrangements 
across Western Europe. However, even where labour force surveys are used, different 
measures restrict our capacity for a comparative analysis. The example given was of two 
different questions used to measure part time work, “do you consider yourself a part time 
worker?” or “do you work more than 35 hours a week?”. The lowest figure for temporary work 
relates to the UK, which then raises the question what is understood as a ‘permanent’ contract. 
There are, in this case, distinct differences relating to rights and protections against dismissal of 
permanent workers which would reduce the number of workers in a country like the UK, with 
weak protections, categorised as temporary.  
 
As a direct result of this problem we are now seeing a growth in independently commissioned 
research, significantly research carried out by national and international unions. In many cases 
union research will be the only source of reliable data about a particular sector or employer. 
This is reflected in the emphasis during the seminar on research commissioned by the Global 
Union Federations which has been an important first step in formulating strategies to address 
the growth in precarious work.  
 
Importance of an international perspective  
The importance of taking an international perspective is related to the nature of the growth of 
precarious work and its regulation.   
 
The majority of working people are not direct employees of multinational companies (MNCs), 
an estimated 1% of the world’s workforce of three billion people. However, a great number work 
indirectly for MNCs as suppliers and contractors. They are hugely influential in shaping 
employment relations both in relation to their role in promoting deregulation and weakening of 
labour protections through the demand for ‘flexibility’, but also as the principal users of 
contractors and employment agencies.   For example, 70% of the workers used by Nestlé to 
manufacture, package and distribute products throughout the world are not directly employed 
by that company (Rossman and Greenfield, 2006). Although the trend is for MNCs to reduce 
direct employment, a trend observed in every sector and part of the world, they are major users 
of contractors and subcontractors. Therefore, the attitudes of  MNCs towards contractors and 
suppliers is crucial to the situation of contract and agency workers, given their strategic 
potential to deepen the responsibilities of contractors and labour agencies, as part of the 
contracting process.  
 
Secondly, there are established and important links between unions and MNCs, leverage that 
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does not exist for unions in relation to large sections of informal and precarious work. Unions, 
particularly global unions and unions located in headquarter companies, have leverage with 
principal companies which can be used to secure basic rights for contract workers. The 
experience of the global unions during the seminar points clearly to the importance of this 
access to and dialogue with employers such as UNILEVER, AngloAmerican and Linde AG.  
 
The third reason why an international perspective is that many of the contractors and agencies 
are, themselves, multinational corporations.  
 
The top 20 private employment agencies, 2008 
Rank  Firm     Origin  Revenue ($ million) 
1  Adecco    Switzerland    31 068.93 
2  Randstad    Netherlands    23 242.91 
3 Manpower    United States   21 552.80 
4  Allegis    United States   5 740.00 
5  Kelly Services   United States   5 517.29 
6  Goodwill Group   Japan    5 465.92 
7  USG People              Netherlands    5 446.22 
8  Hays     UK    4 994.57 
9  Robert Half Int.   United States   4 600.55 
10  Tempstaff    Japan    2 597.15 
11  Volt Information Services  United States   2 427.32 
12  Pasona    Japan    2 271.71 
13  MPS Group    United States   2 222.30 
14  Spherion    United States   2 189.16 
15  Express Employment Professionals United States  2 000.00 
16  Synergie Group   France    1 624.95 
17  Michael Page   United Kingdom   1 443.83 
18 TrueBlue 2    United States   1 384.27 
19 Monster    United States   1 343.63 
20  CDI Corp.    United States   1 118.60 
 
Source: ILO (2009) Private employment agencies, temporary agency workers and their contribution to the labour market.  
Geneva. 
 
According to the ILO, the employment agency industry reached US$441 billion turnover in 
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2007, with six countries controlling 80% of revenues: United States (28 per cent), United 
Kingdom (16 per cent), Japan (14 per cent), France (9 per cent), Germany (6 per cent) and the 
Netherlands (5 percent).  Over the last decade, the key growth market has been in Japan, 
expanding from a market size of US$14.7 billion in 2000 to US$43.3 billion in 2007.  
 
The sheer size of the labour agency sector is an indicator of the resistance that regulation and 
reduction of precarious work will be faced with. Indeed, the problem is magnified when we 
understand that these MNCs are only the formal, visible part of labour contracting. A wide 
range of labour suppliers in the developing world constitute an often unseen but significant 
provider of labour. Often these intermediaries are linked to criminal activity. In most developing 
countries the issue of contract and agency labour blends into broader issues of informal work, 
bonded labour and child labour. This emphasises that in this case, official statistics are of 
limited use which has profound implications for the regulation of precarious work. 
 
International & regional regulation 
The discussions about regulation throughout the seminar were cautious, with views ranging 
from relative optimism about the usability of some mechanisms, such as the OECD guidelines 
on multinational enterprises, but with more critical attitudes towards the regulation of temporary 
agency work at EU and international levels. 
 
It is precisely the hidden and unclear nature of much precarious employment that makes the 
issue of legal strategies so difficult. In part because of the complexity of the nature of 
precarious work, and the difficulties in regulating an unclear employment relationship. This is in 
part due to the nature of the pheonomenon, set up often as an express attempt to avoid 
legislation, particularly labour protections. It is important to note that many forms of contract 
and agency work are set up precisely to avoid the law, described by one speaker as a “seven 
headed monster“, recreating new forms of working contracts precisely to circumnavigate new 
and existing legislation. This is particularly evident in the use of ‘self-employed’ categories of 
workers or, as presented in the case of Colombia, the use of cooperatives with both systems 
effectively removing labour rights. There are, therefore, important barriers to the application of 
existing and even new regulation.  
 
The other important limitation to legal applicability is that the development of precarious work 
arrangements is rapid. Changes and new forms of working arrangements happen quickly, 
compared to the slow process of establishing laws and standards. It has taken ten years for the 
European Directive on Temporary Agency Work to be concluded, during which time the 
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industry has multiplied several times over. There are also many parts of the world where legal 
systems are used to paralyse union activity, probably the most extreme examples being 
Botswana and Thailand where the law is used conflate an already hostile employment 
relationship environment. Aranya Pakaphat’s presentation about organising contract workers in 
the case of Linde in Thailand underlines this paralysing effect of taking labour issues through 
national legal systems.   
 
This said there are important regulatory developments, particularly using the principle of non-
discrimination between contract and permanent workers. This principle is central to many of the 
international and national legal cases underway to protect contract and agency workers.  
 
The main regional and international regulatory tools that are appealed to in relation to 
precarious workers are:  
· ILO Recommendation 198 on the Employment Relationship  
· European Temporary Agency Workers Directive 2002  
· European Posted Workers’ Directive 1996  
· ILO Convention 181 Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 and 
accompanying Recommendation (No. 188)  
· OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and National Contact Points 
· Health & Safety legislation 
· International Framework Agreements (IFAs) 
· ILO C98 the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 and ILO C87 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948  
 
The ILO’s Recommendation 198 on the employment relationship is just a recommendation, 
with all the limitations this implies, however it is important in articulating an important barrier to 
regulation, which is identifying the employer and their relationship to employees.  
The ILO’s Convention 181 was an almost forgotten convention but was revived at the end of 
2009 by the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and the International Trade Union 
Congress (ITUC), promoting its ratification beyond the existing twenty signatories. It requires 
governments to “take necessary measures to ensure adequate protection” for agency workers 
and importantly for agencies to be officially registered.  
 
International Framework Agreements (IFAs) are listed here with some trepidation. These are 
the international agreements signed by over seventy MNCs and trade unions, principally the 
Global Union Federations (GUFs). They are, in principle, an important way of extending 
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standards to contract and agency workers by applying fundamental principles through supply 
and production. Two good examples of this are the IKEA agreement with BWI and the Statoil 
agreement with ICEM. However, the clauses that relate to suppliers and contractors are weak 
and there have, in reality, been few developments to strengthen these clauses. Also, the 
agreements themselves are only as strong as their implementation and in most cases this 
relies on the capacity of representative unions to enforce them (Croucher & Cotton, 2009). 
 
The European Temporary and Agency Workers Directive, broadly introduces the principle of 
equal treatment for temporary workers into European and national legislation. The principle is 
regarded as important in promoting social justice for agency workers, entitling them to some 
equal treatment with fixed contract equivalents. The principle however only applies to basic 
terms and conditions of employment, to include pay, working time, holidays. There is now 
recognition that this would need to include matters of redundancy and job security, in order to 
adequately implement the principle.  
 
Keith Ewing described the process of negotiating this directive as characterized by political 
compromise. The UK played an important role in securing some level of derogation by states, 
introducing important limitations to the scope and application of the directive. In the case of the 
UK, the directive’s implementation is delayed until 2011 5th December and it is conditional on 
the worker satisfying a minimum probation period of twelve weeks. This qualifying period was 
agreed by the TUC and CBI effectively reducing the regulatory impact to 45% of agency 
workers in the UK, based on current statistics about length of service of agency workers. Keith 
underlined that over half of the agency workers in this country will not be covered by the new 
directive. He also proposed that this would encourage employers to expand the practice of 
‘rotation’ where  specific jobs and, in the case of warehouse and distribution sites, the principal 
company, can be rotated every eleven weeks to avoid workers going beyond the qualifying 
period.  
 
The point was made by a number of speakers that EU regulation has different impacts in 
different regulatory settings. A stark example of this is the EU’s Posted Workers Directive, 
which explicitly makes use of different economic and regulatory employment relations systems. 
Participants raised examples, including Sweden where agency workers get paid in between 
contracts as an example of the potentially deregulatory effect on specific countries with high 
levels of protection. Although there is only limited data on cross boarder agency workers, there 
are a number of high profile examples of agencies being able to exploit lower social security 
costs to sell labour abroad. A documented example given was of French workers employed by 
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Luxembourg agencies to work in France, thus exploiting lower social costs. 
 
At international level, the OECD guidelines, although with relatively weak language in the 
guidelines themselves, is a CSR mechanism of particular interest in regulating precarious work 
because of the recent role of the UK National Contact Point (NCP) in securing basic organising 
rights for UNILEVER workers in Pakistan.  
 
An important aspect of regulation is the applicability of Health and Safety regulation which, in 
most countries and sectors, has universal application regardless of the employment status of 
workers. Health and Safety regulations have for a long time been used by unions to overcome 
restrictive organising climates and establish a presence in sectors or types of workers not 
normally covered by traditional trade union activity or collective bargaining. There is also an 
increasing body of research that links the use of contract and agency workers, to increased 
HSE accidents. 
 
In the seminar discussions it was clear that there are some fundamental problems with taking a 
regulatory approach to precarious work through the employment relationship and existing 
contract law. The difficulty in relying on contractual law is that it is based on a clear contract of 
employment, with clearly identified parties. It is one of the characteristics of much precarious 
work, particularly cross boarder work, which makes it extremely difficult to establish who holds 
employers’ responsibilities. This was underlined by Keith Ewing in the case of the UK where 
employment law covers working arrangements where there is an employment contract only, 
defined as a contract of service. However, in the absence of a clear definition of a contract of 
service, how this is established rests on the deliberation of courts. Court decisions on the issue 
of agency workers have not, he argued, been consistent with a 1997 court of appeal decision 
which accepted that an agency worker could be regarded as an employee of the agency 
undermined by the Brooke Street Bureau case where it was argued that an implied contract 
existed between agency workers and the principal company. This was followed by the case of 
the agency worker who was effectively dismissed by Greenwich Council, the user, after many 
years of service but the court was reluctant to imply the existence of a contract between the 
agency worker and client. A final and important case is that of a group of Polish workers hired 
by a Polish agency to work in the UK in the agricultural and hotel sectors. The terms of their 
contract stated expressly that they were not employees of either of the agency or the client 
rather that the workers were independent subcontractors. A number of these workers were fired 
by the agency, and who then submitted a legal claim for victimization because of their 
involvement in union activity. During this legal case and the subsequent appeal, the courts 
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were reluctant to rule against the written contracts of employment and use the implied or de 
facto contract. The Court of Appeal stated that the issue of balancing flexibility and business 
efficiency and the need for social protection for workers was too difficult to be addressed 
through the courts and was an issue that can only be addressed by parliament.  
 
The other serious limit to the regulatory impact of legislation based on the employment contract 
is the mutable nature of precarious work. There is an increasing body of evidence that once a 
form of precarious work falls under existing or new legislation, the form can be changed. This is 
particularly evident in the increased use of the category of ‘self-employed’, because of the 
express exemption from legislation that this status enjoys. 
 
An important implication for regulation relates to legislation around unfair dismissal and 
redundancies. For most precarious workers existing protections do not apply, as workers are 
rarely dismissed, rather their contracts are not renewed or working hours reduced to an 
unsustainable level. The lack of unfair dismissal protections is also a major contributor to 
blocking Freedom of Association and the right to bargain collectively in the case of precarious 
workers. Increasingly global unions are prioritising the development of stronger international 
regulation around unfair dismissals for this reason. 
The ILO’s Core conventions 87 and 98 are mentioned here because of the importance of 
Freedom of Association and collective bargaining in regulation to precarious work. Convention 
98 has 160 out of 183 ratifications but in reality half the world’s working population is not 
included because major countries such as USA, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Thailand and 
Canada have not ratified. In the Celebration of the 60th anniversary of Convention No98 (2009), 
the ILO lists some important ways in which the conventions are routinely violated directly as a 
result of precarious work arrangements. These include: 
 Lack of existence of employers’ and workers’ representatives to conduct collective 
negotiations 
 Increase of non-wage or self-employed working arrangements 
 Increase in cooperatives  
 Transformation of employment contracts into civil or commercial service contracts 
 Specific legal decisions where unions are denied the right to bargain collectively in 
subcontracting enterprises  
 
The soft law track of international regulation has well-understood limitations both in terms of 
application and enforcement. Jenny Holdcroft, from the IMF, presented the case of the Korean 
Metal Workers Federation, which had taken up the case of dispatch workers and their right to 
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join a union. This was a long and complex case, submitted to the ILO’s Committee on Freedom 
of Association (CFA). The basis of the complaint was that the Korean government failed to 
protect the trade union rights of subcontracted workers, on the grounds that the workers were 
not regularized after two years, they were dismissed for organizing their own trade union either 
by non-renewal of individual contracts or termination of service contract with the particular 
agency. In the case of South Korea specific legislation exists around the obstruction of 
business by third parties, where union activity can be restricted. In this case, industrial action 
can only take place by employees towards the employer. In the case of third party agency 
workers their employer is not the organization that owns or manages the physical workplace. In 
effect, agency workers have no right to take industrial action because of this distinction 
between who the employer is and who is responsible for the workplace.  Despite the ILO ruling 
that the Korean government needed to amend this legislation, because of its limitations of 
Freedom of Association and collective bargaining, there has been no response from the 
government with an increased level of industrial conflict as a direct result of the treatment of 
contract workers during this period of recession.  
 
Broader strategies  
The seminar had a heavy representation of trade unionists, because of the importance of trade 
union activity in the regulation of precarious work. Over the last seven to eight years the 
international bodies of trade unions, the Global Union Federations (GUFs) have carried out an 
increasing body of international solidarity work for precarious workers and affiliates trying to 
organise them. The research and campaigning that GUFs have been doing is important both in 
terms of getting this category of workers onto the agenda internationally and nationally and also 
for encouraging unions to respond to these developments. 
 
Unions have key strategic choices such as whether to resist new contractual arrangements or 
whether to limit them. In most cases, there is a strategic choice over whether a union will 
organise precarious workers either into their existing structures or supporting the development 
of new ones.  One of the key challenges to this is the difficulty in resisting the pheonomenon 
without creating a resistance to the precarious workers themselves.  Trade Union responses 
often include carrying out dedicated research and raising awareness amongst their existing 
membership about the importance of working with precarious workers. Many engage in 
campaigns, others involve governmental inspection systems. What is increasingly important, 
both in terms of strategy formulation and encouraging unions to tackle the issue is international 
exchange and contact between unions that are working in this area. This is evidently an 
important aspect of GUF campaigns, to encourage new thinking and promotion of organising 
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successes amongst affiliates to overcome the sometimes overwhelming belief that precarious 
workers cannot be organised.  
 
Public sector unions are strategically important here in determining the scale and conditions 
under which contract and agency workers are employed. Often the attitude of public sector 
unions is pivotal in shaping changes in work organisation, because of the link between 
privatization of public services and establishment of precarious forms of work. In many parts of 
the world the culture of public sector unions differs from private sector unions, with different and 
sometimes non existent approaches to recruitment and atypical workers.  
 
Organising contract & agency workers 
Although many unions have been slow to organise precarious workers, we have seen a steady 
increase in their recruitment into unions over the last five years. In the main, in part in response 
to restrictive national legislation, precarious workers have organised into new trade union 
structures although there are some important exceptions to this. We saw the first ‘non-regular’ 
union in Japan only in 2004 and a number of small but important unions established in most 
parts of the world including Thailand, India, Peru, South Africa, Greece, France, Italy, 
Netherlands. This includes the formation of two contract worker unions, Sintrans and 
Sintrachaneme, in Colombia during 2009.  
 
The Thai case study presented by Aranya Pakaphat was a reflection on the level of 
international intervention that has been needed to organise agency workers in the Thai context. 
Since 2006 ICEM affiliates in Thailand have been attempting to organise agency workers. Thai 
Industrial Gases (TIG), is a strategically important company owned by Linde AG, 
headquartered in Germany, with 1200 permanent workers and an estimated 400 agency 
workers. During 2008 the enterprise union, TIGLU, attempted to bargain on behalf of TIG’s 
distribution workers and truck drivers a number of which had been dismissed for their union 
activity and refusal to sign new contracts of employment, initially with the large labour agency 
Adecco. TIG management refused to negotiate with TIGLU, and stated that the employer’s 
responsibility lay with Adecco. During this period of dispute the contract with Adecco was 
terminated and the agency workers were signed up to an unknown agency which could be 
traced only to an address in a derelict building. In their campaign to get these workers 
reinstated TIGLU organised three strikes, carried out by permanent workers and their families. 
At international level the ICEM was in daily contact coordinating action and approaches to TIG 
and Linde AG, along with the German affiliate IG BCE. One of the difficulties Thai unions face 
in organising agency labour is that agencies and contractors are registered as service sector 
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organisations and, according to Thai labour law, their workforces cannot join existing industrial 
unions. This meant that the TIGLU had to make a difficult but strategic decision to organise 
contract workers into their existing structure, regardless of the law, rather than set up a new 
trade union specifically for agency workers which would leave them small and vulnerable. 
TIGLU also made the strategic decision to only negotiate with TIGLU directly, not accepting the 
company’s position that they were not responsible for protecting the trade union rights of 
workers in their operations. Aranya emphasised that the campaign relied on the position of 
permanent workers in relation to protecting agency workers. In part due to longstanding 
education work within the union and the evident threat to permanent jobs, the union 
membership was fully in support of the campaign, with permanent workers and their families 
even taking over the picket lines during the three strikes.  
 
 
Collective bargaining & dialogue with employers 
In many cases the gains for contract and agency workers come through collective bargaining 
and dialogue with employers. Precarious work can be regulated by collective bargaining or 
social dialogue, with principal companies, contractors and labour agencies, sectoral level, 
national level and at international level through the GUFs. 
   
There is no comprehensive data on what gains have concretely been secured through 
bargaining, however there is an increasing body of evidence that unions are able to secure 
regulation of precarious work through bargaining and dialogue with employers. Areas for 
negotiation are common across different countries and sectors and include: 
 
 Limit the number of contract and agency labour workers in the workplace 
 Limit the categories of work, sectors, or types of jobs where contract and agency 
workers can be employed 
 Limit the circumstances under which contract and agency workers can be employed 
e.g. replace permanent workers in the case of industrial action or dangerous jobs 
 Set maximum time periods  
 Extend existing collective agreements to apply to contract and agency workers 
 Clarifications of the existence and nature of the employment relationship 
 Equal pay, benefits and conditions 
 Training and information provision  
 Transition to permanent status 
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However, it should be noted that many trade unions are not effectively able to carry out their 
bargaining functions because of national regulatory contexts, hostile employers or employment 
relations systems or their own history. In reality, many of the world’s unions have little or no 
experience of organising or collective bargaining. Obvious examples exist in the Russian 
speaking world, where trade unions are slowly moving from their function as welfare 
organisations and the many fragmented and politically divided enterprise unions of Asia and 
Latin America. This problem is conflated in the case of precarious and predominantly 
unorganised workers.  
 
The seminar emphasized the importance of dialogue with employers, with particular reference 
to those MNCs where unions have existing relationships and leverage. In many parts of the 
world already weak unions are faced with the prospect of negotiating on behalf of precarious 
workers where collective bargaining has broadly been in decline both in terms of the number of 
working people covered by them and also the capacity to get employers to the bargaining table. 
Elizabeth Cotton’s case study about work of Sintracarbon in Colombia is a sharp example of 
this, where only an estimated 5% of working people are covered by a CBA and there has been 
an atrophy of collective bargaining. This relates, in part to Colombian law which allows an 
automatic renewal of existing CBAs, in the absence of a formal request for negotiations 
(Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 477). Each time that an agreement is due to be 
renewed unions have to make difficult decisions about their position in relation to the employer 
but also in relation to the potential threats to the negotiating team. In the case of Sintracarbon, 
a union representing 3500 workers in the Cerrejon mine, the largest open caste coal mine in 
the world, the union had missed several years of negotiations during the 1990s and was 
increasingly worried that if they did not reinitiate dialogue with Cerrejon management that 
membership would simply not accept the current terms and conditions. This was a remarkably 
painful dilemma for all unions who on the one side had to be able to bargain for membership in 
order to retain members, but faced often overwhelming difficulties in doing so.  
 
The ICEM’s work in Colombia started through education programmes in the late 1990s, 
focusing on health and safety in the mining sector and education methods. By 2004 the 
education work focused on establishing and supporting a formal process of social dialogue with 
seven MNCs and the ICEM’s six affiliates, including Sintracarbon. The process involved setting 
up quarterly meetings with employers and unions to try to secure agreement and joint activities 
on core and agreed issues. In the first phase of the process it was agreed to focus on core 
issues of HSE, security for unionists and contract and agency labour. The meetings were 
facilitated by ICEM leadership, including representatives of key affiliates from headquarter 
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countries. Through the secretariat there was weekly contact with local, regional and 
international management of the companies involved, to ensure their sustained participation in 
the process. A key part of the process was to commission research on the bargaining issues, 
which included carrying out the first dedicated research on the scale and situation of contract 
and agency labour in ICEM sectors. The research revealed a previously unknown situation that 
the Cerrejon mine directly employs only 50% of the workers within the site, with over 139 
contractors supplying services and labour. As a direct result of this process of research, social 
dialogue and contacts made with the Ministry of Social Protection (MSP), Sintracarbon was 
able to secure joint audits with the MSP of the key labour suppliers and contractors at the mine. 
Management of the relationship with these contractors was improved, including the instigation 
of monthly meetings with the contractors and team responsible within Cerrejon for managing 
them. Most importantly, by 2009 two new unions, Sintrans and Sintrachaneme, were created 
for contract workers after a sustained six month national and international campaign.  
 
Campaigning 
Where dialogue with employers has not been secured unions often use campaigning as a way 
of raising their leverage. The seminar had a detailed analysis by Kirill Buketov from the IUF, of 
their ongoing Casual Tea campaign. The campaign originates in many years of attempts by 
national and international unions to establish dialogue and bargaining with UNILEVER, one of 
the largest food production companies in the world with an estimated impact on seven million 
jobs and responsible for 12% of global tea production. UNILEVER has approximately 500,000 
employees, but by 2000 300,000 were on permanent contracts, reduced to 140,000 by 2008. 
The IUF estimates that over 20,000 permanent jobs are eliminated every year through 
subcontracting, outsourcing and agency labours.  
 
The company policy in relation to unions since the 1970s has been rigidly against any form of 
contact, stating that industrial relations issues are a matter for local producers and managers 
and instructing managers to avoid coordinated bargaining. However, because of the 
importance of UNILEVER, particularly in relation to its strategy to replace permanent workers, 
IUF made the decision to initiate a new campaign to bring UNILEVER into some level of 
dialogue with unions. The campaign that then developed was centrally planned and resourced, 
focussing on the deteriorating conditions and victimisation for non-permanent workers.  
 
One difficulty in campaigning against UNILEVER, which has over 1600 products, is that it is not 
itself a product. The decision therefore was made to focus on a branded and recognizable 
product, Lipton Tea.  The campaign then took up the case of the Pakistan Lipton workers, 
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where eight hundred workers, only twenty two of which were permanent employees, were 
facing serious problems of pay and conditions as well as victimisation for union activity. The 
Lipton campaign focussed on this dispute, with the IUF helping the Pakistan workers to 
organise their own campaign and recruit workers into a newly established union. In 2009, after 
a year of sustained campaigning activity UNILEVER agreed to settle the Pakistan case and 
agreed to create permanent jobs for those workers part of the campaign committee (120 
workers). The campaign makes use of a wide range of mechanisms including the OECD 
Guidelines, social network sites, shareholder action and research, with the strategically 
important support of the Dutch trade union FNV Bondgenoten. The campaign was strongly 
supported by UNILEVER workers in the Netherlands in response to the potential threat of 
‘Hindustanisation’ of employment relations. 
 
Kirill pointed out that in some sense this is not a campaign, because it is a permanent feature of 
the IUF’s work. However, in a situation where a company resists any attempts to meet with 
unions or precarious workers the campaigning element has proved to be important in bringing a 
company into dialogue with unions. 
 
Role of education 
In all the cases presented at the seminar the experience of trade union education has proved to 
be significant and polyvalent, in its capacity to empower and give confidence to participants to 
carry out the often impossible task of organising. As Richard Croucher’s presentation 
highlighted, international trade union education is essentially the bringing  together of trade 
unionists to exchange their experience, something that is vital in the case of precarious work 
where new and innovative strategies need to be employed. Education here is linked to 
research, with emphasis on research that empowers workers to carry out trade union activity 
and understand how their employers actually work and what leverage they have to approach 
them. Research and education in these specific senses are linked by introducing methods that 
help people learn through their own enquiry. This is particularly relevant to precarious work, 
where there is a clear lack of reliable data and commonly trade unions themselves do not know 
the scope and conditions of precarious workers in their workplaces and sectors.   
 
Key discussion points 
A question that helps us frame the discussion about precarious work, raised by Richard 
Hyman, is whether the existing industrial model works in the regulation of precarious work. In 
particular, whether employment relations can be regulated on the basis of contract law and 
whether workers can organise and bargain collectively.  
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What we know is that the organising model not a panacea, and that there are a number of 
existing and new barriers to organising precarious workers, not least the size of the labour 
agency industry and the strategic decisions made by key MNCs to externalise the employment 
relationship. Organising is traditionally workplace based, a model not appropriate to many 
forms of precarious work, and there are conflicting interests at points between precarious and 
permanent workers. Organising also takes resources, intensified in this case as the costs of 
organising increase at the same time that permanent and paying membership declines. As 
precarious worker membership is still relatively small and therefore not able to push this 
agenda through existing union structures it is likely that organising will not take place in the 
absence of genuine political commitment of union leadership. These key issues have to be 
addressed both practically and politically by unions in order for organising to successfully take 
place.  
 
A similar dilemma exists in relation to collective bargaining, where there is a general weakening 
of collective bargaining and coverage. Although we are seeing provisions for precarious 
workers being put on the bargaining agenda, and some gains in this regard, this is a fragile 
area of work.  
 
A proposal, consistent with a number of the speakers, was a focus on sector wide collective 
agreements, and national agreements where they exist. This is particularly important in the 
case of public sector agreements, the restructuring and privatization of which is a key driver of 
the reduction of permanent jobs.  
 
A proposal made by Keith Ewing in connection to this was to focus regulation not on the 
employment relationship, often difficult to establish in any meaningful way, but rather to focus 
on regulation of the job, through sectoral level bargaining. Collective agreements, potentially, 
could set pay and conditions for specific areas of work, which apply regardless of contract of 
employment. This would then move the basis of employment rights away from the employment 
contract, onto the nature of the job and the universal rights that workers have, regardless of 
who the employer is. In the case of abuses of rights what would be significant in this case is not 
who the employer is, rather who has denied specific workers those rights. That is, the proposal 
to regulate the rights and duties of specific jobs, rather than the regulation of the employment 
relationship itself.  
 
This proposal, although not fully explored during the seminar, resonates with the experience at 
international level, where fundamental rights to organise and bargain collectively have proved 
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to be more important in protecting precarious workers than regulation specifically designed to 
do this. 
 
The seminar, and this paper, ends by highlighting the research deficit that exists on the subject 
of precarious work. Whether a regulatory approach is taken, as we saw in the OECD 
guidelines, or a broader organising approach as we saw in Colombia and Thailand, there is a 
key role and need for research. This is an important educational tool for trade unions, providing 
an important opportunity to review employment trends and make contact with precarious 
workers who often fall outside of traditional membership. Research is also an essential part of 
policy and strategy formation for policy makers, trade unions and companies themselves.  The 
appeal was made to the participating organizations to look for alliances and joint projects to 
inform and promote the regulation of precarious work.  
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